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Turkey and the European Union: 
The Domestic Politics of 
Negotiating Pre-Accession
Kemal Kirisci
I. Introduction
In May 2004, ten countries joined the European Union (EU), to 
be followed by two more countries most probably in 2007. Turkey, 
together with Croatia, is the next country in line to enter the pre-
accession process for membership. Turkey was given candidate status 
in December 1999 at the Helsinki European Council summit. How-
ever, accession negotiations with Turkey will only start if the European 
Commission concludes that Turkey has indeed met the Copenhagen 
political criteria and EU member governments make a positive deci-
sion at their European Council meeting in December 2004.1 Unlike the 
case of other candidate countries, the decision “to give or not to give” 
a negotiating date to Turkey stands as a very great challenge. A variety 
of reasons—ranging from the size and population of Turkey, its geo-
graphical location, its low level of economic development compared to 
the EU, and, more importantly, the fact that the overwhelming major-
ity of the population is Muslim—make determining a date for the start 
of the negotiations an extremely controversial and difficult issue for 
many EU governments and for European public opinion.
Turkey itself is facing massive challenges as a function of its aspi-
ration to join the EU. In November 2000, the EU adopted the Acces-
sion Partnership document, which listed the reforms that Turkey was 
expected to adopt to be able to meet the Copenhagen political crite-
ria.2 Turkey has come very close to meeting these criteria. However, 
this became possible only after three years of divisive debates and 
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resistance to reforms from “Euroskeptic” circles in Turkey. It was the 
decisive outcome of the November 2002 elections that brought in a 
government with a strong will to meet the political criteria that made 
this change possible. Nevertheless, reforms such as the lifting of the 
death penalty, the introduction of cultural rights for ethnic minorities 
(especially Kurds), the expansion of various democratic freedoms, the 
introduction of legal and administrative measures to curb endemic 
torture, and institutional arrangements to reduce the influence of the 
military in Turkish politics, were all major challenges to the politi-
cal system. These have been reforms that Euroskeptics energetically 
resisted at every stage. Now that the reforms have been adopted, there 
are still efforts to hinder their implementation. However, this resistance 
is weakening as the Turkish state and society are being transformed in 
an unprecedented manner.
In the last few years, Turkey has also had to meet challenges in the 
area of foreign policy. Most important has been the question of Cyprus. 
Although the resolution of the Cyprus situation is not a prerequisite 
(in the sense that it is not part of the Copenhagen political criteria), the 
European Commission as well as EU governments and the European 
Parliament have made it quite clear that Turkey is much more likely to 
receive a date for accession negotiations if the question is resolved.
The survival of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 
as an independent and separate state had long been an unquestioned 
national cause in Turkey. Former prime minister of Turkey Bülent Ece-
vit summarized this preference in May 1999 as “no solution is actually 
the solution.” However, both in TRNC as well as in Turkey, emerging 
public opinion questioned the traditional policy. Early in 2004, the gov-
ernment’s policy shifted drastically. This, in turn, opened the way to a 
round of negotiations culminating in the referendum of 24 April 2004 
over the “Annan Plan.” The change in Turkish policy was no less than 
a revolution that required bitter political battles. It is highly unlikely 
that this would have occurred without the pressure of the EU and the 
carrot of EU membership.
Similar observations can be made about Turkey’s policy toward the 
war in Iraq in general, and the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq in spe-
cific. The EU is far from having a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). It has been aspiring to develop one since the adoption of the 
Treaty on the European Union in 1992. Yet, as the crisis over the United 
States’ intervention in Iraq demonstrated, the EU became bitterly split. 
Nevertheless, the decision of the Turkish parliament in March 2003 
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not to allow U.S. troops to transit through Turkey came as a surprise 
to many Europeans. Many in Europe had believed that Turkey was 
too loyal or too dependent on the United States. There were also those 
who suspected that Turkey could become a “Trojan horse” of the U.S. 
within the EU. This was a powerful feeling, particularly among the 
French who traditionally have opposed the Americans and have advo-
cated for a strong and independent EU foreign and security policy. 
Furthermore, the March 2003 decision also demonstrated that Turkey 
was able to reach a democratic decision on such a critical issue. Many 
Europeans had thought that Turkey would concede to the pressures 
of the pro-American military. In a similar manner, the government 
also resisted pressure from military and nationalist circles to militarily 
intervene in northern Iraq to preempt the prospective emergence of an 
independent Kurdish state. Then in October 2003, after securing the 
parliament’s authorization to deploy troops in Iraq, the government 
chose not to send troops, after Iraqis and especially Kurds opposed it. 
These decisions were appreciated by the public and by governmental 
circles in the EU.
In the midst of all these challenges, slowly but surely the EU and 
Turkey are moving closer together. Unless a crisis erupts, all indica-
tions are that the likelihood of Turkey receiving a date to start accession 
negotiations is increasing. The challenge now seems to be centered on 
whether the European Council member states will actually live up to 
their end of the deal reached at the Council summits in December 1999 
and 2002.
How can one explain the political process that has brought Turkey, 
after four decades of membership aspirations, to the very gates of EU 
membership? This essay will argue that the process was primarily 
driven by a long and often bitter process of “negotiation” between 
advocates and opponents of membership within Turkey, on the one 
hand, and between a range of Turkish “negotiators or players” and 
their EU counterparts, on the other.
This process of negotiation might best be captured with the help of 
Putnam who, in his seminal work, envisages negotiations (diplomacy) 
to be composed of two sets of games that are being pursued simultane-
ously.3 There are the negotiations being pursued between diplomats or 
decision makers at one level, and there are also the negotiations taking 
place between these decision makers and their respective national con-
stituencies at another level. In other words, the decision makers have 
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to be able to “sell” the decision made at the first level to the actors in 
the second one, or to the public in the largest sense of the word.
A modification to this model can help to better explain the Turkish 
case. It is also useful to add three more elements to the two-level games 
to make them more reflective of the domestic political aspects of inter-
national interactions. The first one is the way decision makers in one 
country interact with the public in the other country. The second one 
involves the level of interaction that takes place between the civil soci-
eties of the two countries. The third element concerns the way critical 
third-party players, such as the European Union, NATO, or the United 
States, relate or interact with domestic actors involved in negotiation 
in a particular domestic context. The latter case is particularly criti-
cal because the discourse and policies adopted by the third party can 
help tip the balance in favor of one or the other player in the domestic 
negotiation. This essay argues that the balance in the domestic negotia-
tion scene in Turkey has been very much a function of the nature of the 
relationship between Turkey and the EU. The more the EU and Turkey 
have engaged in a “virtuous-constructive” rather than a “negative-
exclusionary” set of discursive interactions, the more the pro-mem-
bership players have been strengthened, both in Turkey and the EU. 
If the negotiation game is thought of in terms of iterations both at the 
domestic as well as at the EU-Turkey level, the process has been edg-
ing both sides closer and closer. However, the decision to be reached in 
December 2004 at the European Council remains the ultimate arbiter of 
whether the pro-EU membership players in Turkey will prevail.
II. Historical Background: 
From the Ankara Treaty of 1963 to the Pending December 2004 
Amsterdam Summit of the European Council
Turkey’s quest to become part of Europe and, later, the European Union 
has been a long one. A Westernization and modernization process 
started as early as the late 18th century in the Ottoman Empire. How-
ever, it was with the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923 and 
with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s reforms that Turkey embarked upon a 
systematic and profound modernization project. Ataturk defined his 
efforts to achieve a modern, secular, and Western society as a pro-
cess of “catching up” with contemporary civilization. This process was 
itself manifested in an aspiration to become part of Europe.4 From 
the early days of the Turkish republic, the primary aim of Ataturk 
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and his supporters was to see the country recognized as a respected 
European power.5 In 1949, Turkey became a founding member of the 
Council of Europe, and joined NATO in 1952. Turkey’s relationship 
with the European Economic Community (EEC) started in 1959, when 
the government applied for associate membership.6 This application 
resulted in the Ankara Association Agreement on 12 September 1963. 
The provisions of this Agreement envisaged a gradual process of eco-
nomic integration between Turkey and the EEC. Article 28 also raised 
the prospects of eventual Turkish membership in the EEC. In 1970, 
the Additional Protocol was signed. The Protocol envisaged a 22-year 
transitional period that would end with the establishment of a cus-
toms union. Yet Turkey’s relationship with the European Community 
(EC) experienced problems from the mid-1970s onwards because of 
Turkey’s internal economic problems and political instability. The mili-
tary coup of 1980 worsened relations. The early 1980s also coincided 
with Greece’s membership in the EC. Once a member, Greece rose 
regular objections to any improvement in EC-Turkish relations because 
of Greek-Turkish bilateral problems and Cyprus. Nevertheless, transi-
tion to democracy and economic liberalization led Turkey to apply for 
membership in 1987. In its opinion of 17 December 1989, the Commis-
sion concluded that Turkey was not ready to be a member of the Euro-
pean Union for economic, political, and social reasons.7 However, the 
Commission did not in any way question the right of Turkey to become 
a member of the EC sometime in the future. This is, of course, in stark 
contrast to the Commission’s failure to consider Morocco’s 1987 appli-
cation on the grounds that Morocco is not a European country.
After the end of the Cold War, most of the 1990s were a very dif-
ficult period for Turkey as violence in southeast Turkey increased and 
the Kurdish problem, together with widespread human rights viola-
tions, led to a marked deterioration in EU-Turkish relations.8 Neverthe-
less, in spite of considerable resistance from human rights circles and 
the European Parliament, in the end both sides succeeded in signing 
the Customs Union Agreement of January 1996.9 In Turkey this new 
treaty was very much perceived as a vital step toward eventual full 
membership.10 Hence, when at the Luxembourg summit of the Euro-
pean Council in December 1997, Turkey was not included in the list of 
candidate countries for the next round of enlargement, there was con-
siderable governmental and public disillusionment as well as anger. In 
protest, the Turkish government went as far as breaking off political 
dialogue with the EU, and refused to attend any EU meetings. The 
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Turkish government feared that the EU wanted to develop a “special 
relationship” with Turkey that would fall short of membership.11
A major breakthrough came at the December 1999 EU summit in 
Helsinki when Turkey was granted candidate status. Many factors 
played a role in this dramatic turnaround in the EU’s position.12 The 
arrival of the social democrat government of Gerhard Schröder in Ger-
many in 1999, replacing Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democrat dominated 
government, had a major impact on the decision. Christian Democrats 
have traditionally been much less sympathetic to Turkish membership 
in the EU. The end of the violence surrounding the Kurdish problem 
in Turkey with the capture and trial of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of 
the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the formation of a 
new coalition government in April, led by the social democrat Bülent 
Ecevit, opened the way toward improving democracy in the country. 
Ecevit wrote a personal letter in June 1999 to his German counterpart 
Schröder that he was committed to democratizing and liberalizing 
the country, and he expressed his expectation of support for eventual 
Turkish membership.13 Relations between Greece and Turkey began 
to improve, too. The efforts of both foreign ministers, George Papan-
dreou and Ismail Cem, received growing public support subsequent to 
the two earthquakes the countries experienced in the summer of 1999. 
An unprecedented process of rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations 
began, both at the governmental and the societal level. Greece actu-
ally became a vocal advocate of Turkish membership in the European 
Union.14 These factors created a climate conducive to the Helsinki deci-
sions. Most importantly, the Helsinki summit foresaw the preparation 
of an Accession Partnership document that outlined the economic and 
political reforms that had to be adopted by Turkey to meet the Copen-
hagen criteria. This procedure was employed with the other candidate 
countries at the December 1997 Luxembourg summit. In return, Tur-
key prepared a national program outlining the reforms to be made in 
the short and long terms.
In the summer of 2001, the Turkish parliament finally adopted a 
series of critical amendments to the Turkish constitution to facilitate 
political reforms that met the Copenhagen criteria. These reforms were 
welcomed by the progress report published by the European Commis-
sion in 2001, although the report also noted that there was still a lot 
of ground to cover before the Copenhagen political criteria would be 
met.15 These developments coincided with continued improvement in 
Greek-Turkish relations as well as a major breakthrough on Cyprus, 
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when Rauf Denktash and Glascos Klerides met in December 2001 with 
the intention of restarting negotiations for the settlement of the Cypriot 
problem. Furthermore, a compromise agreement was reached between 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States about the use of 
NATO facilities in the context of the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP), adding to the positive climate in EU-Turkish relations.16 
This climate played a critical role in resolving the objections of some 
members of the EU to Turkey’s participation in the Convention on the 
Future of Europe.17 This was reflected in the decision of the Laeken 
European Council summit in December 2001. Turkey had finally 
gained access to the Convention. In Turkey this was received as a very 
positive development, considering that Turkey had been completely 
left out of the institutional arrangements to accommodate the new 
wave of enlargement introduced by the Nice Treaty of 2000.
However, in 2002, the reform process slowed when Euroskeptics, 
as well as the nationalist right-wing partner of the coalition govern-
ment, led by Devlet Bahçeli, began to object to some of the critical 
reforms required for meeting the Copenhagen political criteria.18 The 
reforms included the lifting of the death penalty and the introduction 
of certain cultural rights, especially for the Kurds. The spring of 2002 
was characterized by a very heated, divisive, and contentious debate 
on membership in the EU. The standard accusations gained intensity: 
that the EU was a Christian club that would never admit Turkey, and 
that the reforms being demanded aimed to weaken Turkish national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The campaign of the Euroskeptics 
included hacking the e-mail messages of the European Commission 
representative, Karen Fogg. Many public figures supportive of mem-
bership who had communicated with her by e-mail were branded as 
collaborators and traitors to Turkey and its independence.19 Yet, in 
spite of divisions within the coalition, the government received enough 
votes to push through a critical reform package in August 2002. It 
addressed the above as well as other sensitive issues. Support from 
pro-EU civil society groups, ranging from the Turkish Industrialists’ 
and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) and the Economic Develop-
ment Foundation (IKV) to ad hoc groups such as Avrupa Hareketi (the 
Europe Movement), as well as media campaigns, helped to mobilize 
the critical parliamentary margin.20 Powerful pro-EU public opinion 
also contributed to this outcome.21 However, relations within the coali-
tion making up the government became strained, and the government 
had to hold an early election in November 2002.
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The outcome of the elections in November was no less than a polit-
ical earthquake. All the government parties as well as those politi-
cal parties that had served in previous governments lost their seats.22 
Instead, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a breakaway party 
from an existing Islamist one, won an overwhelming majority of the 
seats to comfortably form a government. The social democrat Republi-
can People’s Party (CHP) returned to the parliament as the only opposi-
tion party. The AKP had entered elections with a clear pro-EU agenda 
and promised to support reforms. The CHP, too, had advocated mem-
bership in the EU. Once the government was in place, a campaign was 
mounted to convince European governments to offer Turkey a date 
for negotiations. However, to the great disappointment of the govern-
ment, at the Copenhagen summit Turkey was given no more than “a 
date for a date.” Accordingly, the European Council promised Tur-
key that in December 2004 it would consider whether accession nego-
tiations could start “without delay” as long as Turkey completed its 
remaining reforms.23 The government had hoped to have negotiations 
start before ten new countries formally joined the EU in May 2004. It 
was concerned that Turkey could face additional complications if the 
decision to start negotiations depended on the support of twenty-five, 
rather than fifteen, member countries. The ten new countries included 
the Greek side of Cyprus, and the government feared that without a 
solution to the Cyprus issue, the Greek Cypriots would likely veto a 
date for Turkey.
At the Copenhagen summit, the government also tried very hard 
to gain a breakthrough on the deadlocked negotiations over Cyprus 
as well as get a negotiation date. The government, freshly in power 
and facing considerable opposition from hard-liners and the state 
establishment, argued that it would be political suicide to advocate a 
compromise on Cyprus and still face the risk of not getting a date for 
negotiations. In spite of hectic efforts and growing public opinion in 
support of a solution among Turkish Cypriots on the island, the gov-
ernment failed to deliver a breakthrough. Instead, Rauf Denktash, the 
president of TRNC and chief negotiator for the Turkish Cypriot side, 
walked away from the last round of talks in the Hague in March 2003 
without accepting a solution. Subsequently, when the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the UN, Kofi Annan, prepared his report on Cyprus in April 
2003, the Turkish side was labeled the culprit in the failure.24
The government faced these tough political issues during a period 
when the actual leader of the AKP, Tayyip Erdogan, could not serve 
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as prime minister because of a technicality in Turkish electoral law 
that kept him from contesting the November 2002 election. This natu-
rally weakened the political strength of the government. However, in 
a by-election held in March to fill an empty seat in parliament, Erdo-
gan was carried into the parliament with a comfortable margin. He 
took over the premiership from Abdullah Gül, who continued to serve 
in the cabinet as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime 
Minister. Subsequently, the government turned its focus on remain-
ing internal reforms to meet the Copenhagen specifications. Two sets 
of reforms introduced in June and August critically strengthened the 
right to broadcast and educate in minority languages, and curtailed 
the institutional channels of influence that the military traditionally 
enjoyed over Turkish politics.25 These were highly controversial and 
contested reforms that were resisted by supporters of the status quo. 
The developments were accompanied by a steady amelioration in the 
Turkish economy, which had fallen into a deep recession in February 
2001. The conspicuous recovery of the economy became a factor that 
steadily strengthened the hand of the government.
The impact of the reforms became increasingly visible during the 
second half of 2003. The performance of the Turkish stock exchange, 
as well as interest and exchange rates, became visible measures of gov-
ernment performance in respect to the adoption and implementation 
of the reforms. The more the “markets” perceived the government’s 
performance as positive in respect to a negotiation date, the more the 
value of shares at the stock exchange increased and the Turkish cur-
rency, traditionally very weak, gained value against the U.S. dollar 
as well as the Euro. Furthermore, the public use of Kurdish in the 
form of publications, concerts, and conferences (especially in Kurd-
ish populated areas) became much more visible. Maybe most impor-
tantly, calls by certain hard-liners went unheeded that emergency rule 
should be reintroduced in southeastern provinces because of threats of 
instability emanating from neighboring Iraq. Furthermore, the security 
forces and the government succeeded in handling the aftermath of the 
November 2003 terrorist attacks in Istanbul in a very professional and 
effective way. The culprits were identified and prosecuted in an unusu-
ally transparent manner, without putting any of the gains from the 
reforms into doubt. The government and the prime minister in person 
unequivocally expressed empathy and solidarity with the Jewish com-
munity in Turkey.
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The progress report and strategy paper on Turkey, prepared by the 
European Commission and released in October 2003, acknowledged 
the reforms and progress.26 Nevertheless, the Commission did note 
that the implementation of the reforms would be closely monitored 
and that there remained a number of areas where reforms were still 
needed. The Commission also established a link between getting a date 
for accession negotiations and the solution of the Cyprus problem. The 
linkage provoked reactions in Turkey and arguments that the solution 
of the Cyprus problem had not been a part of the Copenhagen political 
criteria. The controversy continued until the visit of Romano Prodi in 
January 2004, when he affirmed that the solution of the Cyprus prob-
lem was not part of the Copenhagen criteria, and that the Commission 
would base its final recommendation to the European Council only on 
the reforms and their implementation. However, he did note that the 
ultimate decision would be a political one and that the absence of a 
solution in Cyprus risked affecting the final outcome negatively.
Subsequently, the government did indeed change its policy on 
Cyprus, and the Turkish Cypriot community overwhelmingly sup-
ported the Annan Plan at a referendum held in April 2004. Although 
the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriots prevented the island 
from being united, the Turkish Cypriots were exonerated from the 
accusation that they prevented a solution.
In respect to the completion and implementation of the Copenhagen 
criteria, a major breakthrough was achieved in June 2004 when Leyla 
Zana and her colleagues were released from detention, and broadcast-
ing started in ethnic minority languages, including Kurdish. These 
developments were acknowledged by the European Council summit 
on 17–18 June 2004. The European Council reiterated its earlier deci-
sion to open negotiations “without delay” when and if the European 
Commission reports that Turkey “fulfills the Copenhagen criteria.”
III. The Domestic Politics of Getting to Pre-Accession
The Turkish government has had to negotiate the issue of EU member-
ship on the one hand with the EU (in particular the European Commis-
sion and the member countries as well as occasionally the European 
Parliament) and, on the other hand, with various constituencies within 
Turkey itself. The domestic constituencies have included civil society 
groups, such as trade unions, business associations, and EU-specific 
nongovernmental organizations, as well as political parties and the 
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broader public opinion. It has also included the military and various 
bureaucracies—in other words, the state establishment. The politics 
of negotiating and breaking the resistance to the adoption of reforms 
has not been easy. The resistance, especially in the early stages of the 
reform process, came from members of the parliament, bureaucracies, 
and the military, as well as their allies among the politicians and in 
civil society—often academics, journalists, and retired officials, who 
could make their views publicly known more easily than currently 
serving officials. The government has had to rely on the political sup-
port of pro-EU civil society groups and public personalities, ranging 
from academics and journalists to pro-EU liberal retired diplomats and 
high-ranking retired military officers, to overcome the reluctance to 
adopt and support the reforms.
In the first three years of the process that started with the release of 
the Accession Partnership (AP) document by the European Commis-
sion in November 2000,27 the coalition government was divided within 
itself. The right-wing Nationalist Action Party (MHP) was often the first 
obstacle in the way of some of the more critical reforms.28 The absence 
of coherence and powerful political will to pursue reforms would, in 
turn, weaken the government’s ability to mobilize support among cru-
cial bureaucracies, such as the Ministry of Interior and Justice, not to 
mention the military. This was most conspicuously manifested during 
the preparation of the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis 
(NPAA).29 In most other candidate countries, the preparation of such a 
document was quite straightforward and completed within a matter of 
weeks. Conversely, the Turkish proceedings dragged on until the end 
of March. The government had to negotiate endlessly with different 
parts of the state apparatus in an effort to find an acceptable formula-
tion for reforms, especially on the more sensitive issues like the lifting 
of the death penalty, the expansion of freedom of expression, and the 
introduction of cultural rights. There were a number of draft versions 
prepared. The final version fell well short of expectations and the AP 
itself.
The wording adopted for the critical reforms was vague and ambig-
uous. Cases in point were the lifting of capital punishment and the 
introduction of cultural rights. The AP emphasized the removal of “any 
legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother 
tongue in TV/radio broadcasting” and the need to ensure the “cultural 
diversity and guarantee of cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of 
their origin.” It also specified the need to “abolish [the] death penalty, 
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[and] sign and ratify Protocol No. 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights” in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. In 
addition, the AP called for the reduction of the influence of the military 
by noting the need to “align the constitutional role of the National 
Security Council as an advisory body to the government in accor-
dance with the practice of EU member states.”30 The NPAA was sim-
ply silent on the prospects of TV/radio broadcasting in mother-tongue 
languages other than Turkish and the reduction of the military’s influ-
ence.31 Instead, it noted that the official language of Turkey and that 
of education was Turkish. It did, though, stipulate that there could 
be no obstacles placed on the free use of other languages and dialects 
by people in their day-to-day lives. However, the NPAA did maintain 
that this freedom could not be used for the purposes of separatism. 
Regarding capital punishment, the NPAA did not go beyond stating 
that the parliament would consider lifting it in the medium term, and 
remained silent on the adoption of Protocol No. 6.32 Hence, the NPAA 
reflected the attempt to strike a balance between the need to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria and the unwillingness to implement reforms on 
the most sensitive issues.33
It was not surprising that most of these issues were not addressed 
until the first half of 2002, with the debate that surrounded them bit-
terly divisive. Serious tensions occurred within the governing coali-
tion. Ironically, when the reforms were finally adopted in August 2002, 
they had gone well beyond what had been envisaged in the NPAA. 
However, the critical reforms could only be adopted with the support 
of votes from opposition parties. The MHP refused to lend its sup-
port. This further strained relations within the governing coalition and 
led to a decision to hold early elections. The strong majority that the 
new government received in the elections, accompanied by a growing 
confidence in the ranks of pro-EU circles, enabled the government to 
adopt further reforms during the first half of 2003. The government 
improved on earlier reforms of cultural rights, especially by adopting 
legislation facilitating their implementation. It also signed Protocol No. 
6 as well as Protocol No. 7, which abolished the death penalty in war-
time too. The role of the military was indeed curtailed by redefining its 
status in the National Security Council. In adopting these reforms, the 
government went considerably beyond what was initially stated in the 
NPAA. Not surprisingly, the new version of the NPAA, published in 
July 2003, is in much greater harmony with the new Accession Partner-
ship document adopted by the EU in March 2003.34
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Nevertheless, the government still faced resistance. This time the 
resistance was in respect to implementation. It manifested itself most 
openly in the area of cultural rights. There were, for example, reports 
of officials refusing to register Kurdish names for newborn babies until 
they were instructed to do so by courts ruling in favor of complaints 
from the public. Similarly, some local police chiefs attempted to pre-
vent concerts, conferences, or cultural activities held in Kurdish in 
southeastern cities or towns. On each occasion, it would be interven-
tion from higher-level local government or courts or the prosecutor’s 
office that would resolve the problem. There were also efforts by some 
officials to prevent courses in the Kurdish language by raising tech-
nical obstacles, claiming that the premises where such courses were 
planned did not meet building codes, for example.
However, slowly but surely, implementation appears to be improv-
ing, even if the EU and the European Parliament continue to flag imple-
mentation problems in respect to cultural rights.35 The government 
acknowledges the problems and seems resolute to overcome them. 
Implementation problems are routinely addressed at the beginning of 
each weekly cabinet meeting to ensure that governmental decisions are 
carried out.
The question of Cyprus is one other area where the government 
met constant resistance. The previous government had felt com-
pelled to encourage Rauf Denktash to enter negotiations over the plan 
announced by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in November 2002.36 
This uniquely detailed and comprehensive plan envisaged the estab-
lishment of a reunited Cyprus, delicately striking a balance between 
the two sides on the island. The negotiations failed to produce a version 
of the Plan acceptable to both sides before the Copenhagen European 
Council summit in December 2002. An effort to achieve a last minute 
compromise by March 2003 failed miserably when the new Turkish 
government, overwhelmed with the crisis over Iraq, could not per-
suade Rauf Denktash and his allies in Turkey to relent. Consequently, 
the Greek-Cypriot government would be entering the EU as represent-
ing Cyprus. The Helsinki summit had noted: “The European Council 
underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of 
Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by 
the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on 
accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this 
the Council will take account of all relevant factors.”37 The failure of 
the Turkish side to cooperate in finding a solution around the Annan 
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Plan, and the declaration by Rauf Denktash that he considered the 
Annan Plan “dead,” led the Greek side to clear the final legal hurdle on 
the way to membership in May 2004.
The unwillingness to encourage the Turkish-Cypriot side to achieve 
a solution via the Annan Plan, in spite of the Turkish government’s 
commitment, was a conspicuous example of the difficulties created by 
those circles in Turkey committed to preserving the status quo. Pre-
empting a solution to the Cyprus situation had become a convenient 
tool in the hands of those who either did not wish to see Turkey prog-
ress along the path toward EU membership or who simply resented the 
damage the reform process was inflicting upon their interests. Cyprus 
was a particularly easy card to play as the plight of Turkish Cypriots 
was always considered to be a national cause. Advocates of a solution 
in Cyprus risked accusations of wanting to give away Cyprus for the 
personal benefits that would accrue from EU membership. Neverthe-
less, the December 2002 and January 2003 Turkish-Cypriot demonstra-
tions in support of a solution and EU membership, accompanied by an 
unprecedented public debate in Turkey about Cyprus, gradually began 
to change the climate in favor of the government. The government also 
succeeded in consolidating its power and leadership during the course 
of the first half of 2003.
The election of Tayyip Erdogan to parliament in a by-election in 
March and his popularity as prime minister, in addition to the deci-
siveness with which his government pushed two sets of critical reforms 
through parliament, also strengthened the hand of the government. 
The success in getting these reforms adopted brought Turkey very 
close to meeting the Copenhagen political criteria. This was acknowl-
edged by the European Commission in its regular progress report for 
2003, as well as at the European Council summit in Rome in Decem-
ber.38 However, the encouraging signs from the EU were also accompa-
nied by immense pressure since the absence of a solution over Cyprus 
would severely complicate Turkey’s prospects for getting a negotiating 
date in December 2004.39
These pressures were exacerbated by the outcome of the December 
2003 elections in TRNC. The results indicated a bitterly divided island, 
although with a slight edge enjoyed by the ticket that advocated EU 
membership and a solution to the problem in Cyprus. This opened 
the prospects for the government in Ankara to entertain a last minute 
attempt to restart negotiations over the Annan Plan. The government 
by now had not only consolidated its power but had also acquired 
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experience in mobilizing support for a political initiative. Additionally, 
it had the enormous advantage of an economy that was giving robust 
signs of recovery. The inflation rate had been falling at a pace well 
beyond what had been expected and industrial output was expand-
ing, accompanied by an explosion in exports. The “markets” in Turkey 
were optimistic but also very sensitive to any sign of deviation from 
policies enhancing the likelihood of Turkey receiving a negotiating 
date. A combination of these factors enabled the government to skill-
fully negotiate, during the course of January 2004, a decision with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the military, and the president’s office—not 
to mention Rauf Denktash—to revise Turkey’s decades old policy. The 
new policy lent unequivocal support to restarting talks on the basis of 
the Annan Plan, with the clear intention of reaching a solution by May 
2004, so that the way to the accession of a reunited Cyprus to the EU 
would be opened. Tayyip Erdogan argued that Turkey’s new strategy 
was “always to be one step ahead of the Greek-Cypriots” in respect to 
finding a solution.
Retrospectively, it is highly likely that this revolutionary turnabout 
in Turkey’s Cyprus policy will be remembered as the most critical 
decision that this government was able to wrench from domestic con-
stituencies resisting the changes. This turnabout may come to be seen 
as the moment when the balance between those in Turkey who were in 
support of EU membership and those who were against it tipped deci-
sively in favor of the former group.
IV. The Politics of Supporting versus Opposing the EU
At the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to identify two main 
groups in respect to the domestic politics of Turkey’s EU membership 
aspirations. The first group is composed of Europhiles. They are out-
right advocates of EU membership for a variety of reasons, ranging 
from ideological to political and economic. They argue that efforts to 
meet the Copenhagen criteria and pre-accession itself will contribute 
to Turkey becoming a more democratic and prosperous country. These 
people do not necessarily feel disturbed by the erosion of national 
sovereignty, and consider the sharing or transfer of sovereignty with 
EU institutions an acceptable cost of membership. In other words, they 
are comfortable with the notion of a postmodern state with its plu-
ralist democracy, multicultural identity, and multi-tiered governance. 
Among these people there are even those who use a nationalist dis-
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course by arguing that a Turkey that is a member of the EU would also 
be a Turkey that is economically, politically, and militarily more pow-
erful and influential in its region.
The other group is composed of Euroskeptics. They resist change 
and reform. They consider the reforms a threat to national security and 
the independence of the country. Typically, they are extremely wary of 
supranationalism. They are suspicious of the EU as well as the interna-
tional community at large, often arguing that the EU and the West in 
general aim to weaken Turkey and cause its territorial disintegration. 
Some view the reforms, especially the ones on cultural rights, free-
dom of expression, and the weakening of the military’s role in Turk-
ish politics, as tools with which the EU aims to implement its grand 
policy of weakening Turkey. They consider these reforms dangerous 
to Turkey’s ability to survive and meet the security challenges arising 
from a particularly problematic neighborhood. In this group, there are 
many officials who see their influence and power being eroded by the 
reforms. There are also those who are uncomfortable with concepts 
like transparent and accountable government. The EU, in their eyes, 
is an intruder or a threat to their way of life. There are also those who 
oppose the EU on the grounds that membership will erode Turkish 
culture and identity.
These two groups, of course, are far from being internally homog-
enous. Among the advocates of membership in the EU, paradoxically, 
there are many who do not actually trust the EU. Public opinion sur-
veys in Turkey regularly record high levels of support for membership 
accompanied with low levels of trust in the EU. Many also believe that 
the EU would not admit Turkey even if Turkey were to meet all the 
Copenhagen criteria.40 On the other hand, among the Euroskeptics 
there are also those who argue that they are not against Turkish mem-
bership per se. However, they argue that Turkey’s geographical loca-
tion and the difficult neighborhood that it finds itself in should entitle 
Turkey to special treatment. In other words, they advocate the dilution 
of some of the reforms, such as the lifting of capital punishment, the 
introduction of cultural rights for minority groups, and the reduction 
of the influence and role of the military in government decision mak-
ing.41
Both groups span the political spectrum, Left to Right. Currently, 
the AKP, which defines itself as a conservative political party with a 
strong Islamist background, is the most vocal advocate of EU member-
ship while the MHP, also a conservative/right-wing nationalist party, is 
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conspicuously against membership. Yet public opinion surveys have 
also shown that support for membership among MHP voters is sur-
prisingly high. In a survey run in the midst of the divisive debates pre-
ceding the August 2002 package, the average of those voting for MHP 
and supporting membership was higher (68%) than the average for the 
country (64%).42 The social democratic CHP is openly supportive of EU 
membership. In the parliament, it has lent support for the reform pack-
ages adopted by the government. However, there are many prominent 
CHP figures who have on numerous occasions spoken against policies 
that would bring Turkey closer to the EU. The Cyprus problem is a 
case in point. Both Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP, and some of 
his lieutenants have resisted policies seeking a solution to the problem. 
Onur Öymen stated that on Cyprus their position was no different 
from the nationalist right-wing MHP. Even though there was some 
reaction against this statement from within the Party, the leader of 
the Party did accuse the government of “selling Cyprus to the Greek 
Cypriots.”43
The Motherland Party (ANAP) and the True Path Party (DYP), two 
conservative liberal parties that have been voted out of the parliament 
in the last elections, have traditionally advocated membership in the 
EU. Yet they too have included politicians in their ranks who have not 
been very keen to support reforms. One political party that was openly 
and unashamedly opposed to the European Union was the Islamist 
Welfare Party (Refah), led by Necmettin Erbakan. Refah has since been 
replaced by the Saadet Party, which has maintained the same line. In 
public opinion polls, it is Saadet voters who have a level of support for 
membership in the EU below 50%.44 Lastly, there are left-wing groups 
that are as much opposed to the EU as nationalist right-wing groups. 
Surprisingly, they often use very similar slogans and discourse as their 
nationalist right-wing counterparts. For example, the Socialist Party 
and the Turkish Communist Party accuse the EU of imperialism and 
wanting to erode Turkey’s national independence and sovereignty.
The state apparatus, with its military, judiciary, police, treasury, 
educational establishment, and administration in general, is far from 
homogenous. It is possible to find officials that are openly in support 
of the EU as well as those who are against it. However, state institu-
tions often avoid making their views known openly. There is a long 
established tradition to maintain a uniform facade. The views can often 
be deduced, though, from practices or from opinions expressed by 
retired personnel. Hence, for example, it is not unusual to find retired 
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generals or diplomats who take positions and offer arguments in sup-
port of or against EU membership. One institution that is often under 
close public scrutiny in respect to EU membership is the military. Both 
within Turkey and abroad, the military is often presented as being 
against membership. The argument is that the military is uncomfort-
able with many of the reforms demanded by the Copenhagen political 
criteria, especially those that call for the curtailment of their influence. 
The military is also often cited as one major, if not the major, opponent 
of a solution in Cyprus.
Undoubtedly, the need to accommodate the views of Euroskeptics 
within the state bureaucracies and the military played a very impor-
tant role in why it took the government so long to put together the 
first NPAA in 2001, and why this document fell well short of the initial 
AP. There were a number of reforms with which the military seemed 
uncomfortable, notably reforms centering on freedom of expression 
and minority cultural rights. Yet, in the end, the military did not stand 
in the way of these reforms. Furthermore, the military did not oppose 
the gradual lifting of the emergency rule law in the southeastern prov-
inces of Turkey. (The emergency rule law was introduced in 1987 to 
combat the PKK and separatism in southeastern Anatolia.) The law 
was considered by many human rights groups as the primary cause of 
widespread human rights violations and forced migration.45 In 2002, 
when capital punishment was being heatedly debated by the politi-
cians and the public, the military made it very clear that they did not 
object to such a reform.46 Most importantly, the military acquiesced to 
a reform package in June 2003 that significantly curtailed the powers 
of the National Security Council, the body through which the military 
traditionally exercised its influence in Turkish politics.47 More surpris-
ingly, in January 2004, the military supported the new governmental 
initiative to restart negotiations over Cyprus. When Rauf Denktash 
seemed reluctant to lend his support to the initiative of the Turkish 
government, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Hilmi 
Özkök, cautioned him that the military was behind the initiative.48 Fur-
thermore, in a gesture of confidence, the Commander of the Ground 
Forces, General Aytaç Yalman, cancelled a routine visit to inspect Turk-
ish troops on the island.49
Yet there have been a number of occasions when high-ranking offi-
cers expressed views that cannot be reconciled with the official posi-
tion of the military as expressed by the Office of the Chief of Staff. The 
Turkish military is known for its discipline and rigid chain of com-
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mand. Hence, the expression of such opinions, openly or covertly, is 
considered a sign of discomfort with the official military position and 
the government. It is generally known that there is considerable con-
cern in the officer corps about the credentials and credibility of the cur-
rent government and the AKP in respect to secularism. There are many 
in the corps who are suspicious of the government’s commitment to 
secularism. The policies as well as statements of government officials 
and the AKP are closely scrutinized. Often high-ranking officers do 
not shy away from making their opinions heard and even precipitating 
a crisis. This mistrust profoundly shapes the attitude of many in the 
military toward EU membership and the new reforms.
For the military, the issue of EU membership is very complicated. 
Traditionally, the legacy of Ataturk’s modernism has been interpreted 
as Turkey joining the West or becoming part of the West. Hence, mem-
bership in the EU is sometimes viewed as the acid test of the ful-
fillment of Ataturk’s legacy and reforms. This point was stressed by 
Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff General Büyükanıt at an 
international conference in Istanbul in May 2003. He said, “I state once 
again the views of the Turkish Armed Forces on this issue with capital 
letters; Turkish Armed Forces cannot be against the European Union 
because the European Union is the geo-political and geo-strategic ulti-
mate condition for the realization of the target of modernization which 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk chose for the Turkish nation.”50 In spite of 
these remarks, many observers think that there has also been consider-
able apprehension about meeting the Copenhagen political criteria in 
the ranks of the military.
Firstly, education and socialization in the military is centered on a 
deeply embedded distrust of the West and, by extension, the EU. Gen-
erations of officers have been formed with the belief that the West, in 
this case the Europeans and the United States, are imperialist and are 
driven with the desire to weaken and divide up Turkey. The reforms 
that are demanded from Turkey for pre-accession are evaluated from 
this perspective. Many in the military genuinely believe that the EU 
would never admit Turkey as a member. Hence, they consider at least 
some of the reforms as tools to weaken Turkey’s national cohesion and 
sovereignty as well as its ability to defend secularism.51
Secondly, the military’s view of international relations is very much 
steeped in realpolitik. International politics is viewed as an arena of 
power struggle in which the states that are militarily strong and cohe-
sive stand a better chance of surviving. The notion that states can enter 
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into win-win cooperative relationships is utterly foreign. They may 
recognize that the EU has achieved a Kantian peace zone or a “security 
community” among its membership; however, they will simply not 
believe that Europeans would be prepared to include Turkey in such 
a system.
The frustration associated with the debate over EU membership 
and the intentions of the EU in seeking reforms in Turkey leads to 
tension that sometimes erupts into the limelight. A case in point is the 
virulent and surprising manner in which the Secretary-General of the 
National Security Council, General Tuncer Kilinç (at an international 
military conference in Istanbul in March 2002), declared that the EU 
was a “Christian Club” and that it was a “neo-colonialist force deter-
mined to divide Turkey.” He proposed that Turkey abandon its bid for 
EU membership and seek closer relations with Russia and Iran. His 
remarks precipitated a lively debate in Turkey.52 However, the next day 
a former president of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, delivered a scathing 
criticism of the General’s argument verging on mockery. Then-Chief 
of the Turkish General Staff General Hüseyin Kivrikoglu, too, felt the 
need to reassure the public that General Kilinç had expressed his per-
sonal opinion but that for the military, membership in the EU was a 
“geostrategic” objective.53
There are an abundance of examples indicative of the unrest in the 
higher ranks of the military. A similar situation occurred in January 
2004, right at a time when the government was trying to get its new 
policy on Cyprus adopted. During the intra-bureaucracy negotiations, 
a story was leaked to the Turkish daily Cumhuriyet (known for its sup-
port of a hard-line position on Cyprus) that the military had come up 
with a plan for Cyprus that conflicted with the one prepared by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.54 The story appeared at a time when there 
were critical internal discussions taking place to nudge Turkish policy 
toward supporting the Annan Plan—a highly controversial effort par-
ticularly among Euroskeptics and advocates of the status quo. The 
stories concerning divisions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the military were immediately denied by the Office of the General 
Staff. Instead, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff declared that there 
were no differences within the state apparatus, and that stories alleg-
ing such differences were weakening Turkey’s hand.55 This was also 
the case when the media was heavily engaged in a broader debate over 
the problem of Cyprus and its link to EU membership. Against this 
background, the Commander of the Third Army, General Tolon, made 
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a public statement that those who advocated policies amounting to 
an abandonment of the TRNC (“ver kurtul” was a slogan used by the 
advocates of the status quo in Cyprus and critical of those who sup-
ported the Annan Plan) were simply “traitors.”56 His statements pro-
voked a furor in the media as well as a public rebuke from the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül. Once more, the office of the General 
Staff had to intervene. The General was summoned to Ankara for con-
sultations and subsequently declared that he had been misunderstood 
and that the media had typically twisted his words.
These manifestations of unrest within the military are themselves 
signs of a painful transformation that is taking place in the Turkish state 
apparatus. However, recent developments suggest that the military, as 
well as other state agencies, is beginning to adjust to the new realities 
and that the transformation is being consolidated. There is a lot to be 
said about the success of the government in changing hearts and minds 
within the state apparatus and among Euroskeptics. Undoubtedly, the 
support that the government has received from parts of the general 
public and pro-EU groups within civil society has also been critical. 
Ironically, it is possible to include among the ranks of the Europhiles 
the military as well as prominent state officials. In spite of the nature 
of education and socialization in the military and the bureaucracy, nei-
ther institution is immune to the changes occurring within the country. 
Hence, some of the officer corps and bureaucrats are able to distance 
themselves from established wisdom and take positions closer to the 
ones advocated by Europhiles.
V. The EU and its Impact on Turkish Domestic Politics
One other critical factor in this process of transformation is the interac-
tion between Turkey and the EU. In other words, what the EU does, 
how it handles Turkey, and the discourses it uses all have a significant 
impact on the debate between Europhiles and Euroskeptics in Tur-
key. The posture that the EU takes toward Turkey also impacts the 
government’s ability to persuade and mobilize various domestic con-
stituencies in support of reforms. It plays a critical role in the balance 
between Europhiles and Euroskeptics in the domestic negotiation of 
pre-accession.
The more the EU has positively engaged Turkey, the more forthcom-
ing the Turkish side has been in overcoming resistance and obstacles in 
the way of better EU-Turkish relations. Positive relations have tended 
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to strengthen the hand of Europhiles and the prospects of reform. 
Positive moves on the part of Turkey have, in turn, enabled the EU side 
to take steps supportive of Turkey’s prospects of pre-accession and 
membership. In this case, it is possible to talk about iterations of inter-
actions that resemble a virtuous circle—interactions that bring the two 
sides closer to each other while enabling the government and reform 
constituencies to tip the balance in their favor against the onslaught 
of Euroskeptics. In the course of the last two years it is possible to 
speak of such a virtuous circle in EU-Turkish relations. But this was not 
always the case.
The 1990s in general were characterized by poor relations and deep 
mistrust in EU-Turkish relations. Many EU member governments as 
well as the European parliament were critical of Turkey’s human rights 
record and its handling of the violence surrounding the Kurdish prob-
lem.57 Generally, the EU took the position that Turkey had to get its 
own house in order before its membership aspirations could be taken 
seriously. The EU’s call for a political solution to the Kurdish problem 
and its advocacy of “minority rights” played into the hands of Euro-
skeptics, who argued that the EU was only interested in weakening 
Turkey’s territorial integrity. For example, in 1995, Süleyman Demirel 
reacted in an unusually forceful way to remarks made by the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppé, that Turkey should find a 
political solution to the Kurdish problem. Demirel argued that Juppé’s 
statement was unequivocal evidence of Western intentions to create a 
Kurdish state in Turkey.58 The decision of the EU at it’s Luxembourg 
summit in 1997 to exclude Turkey from the list of candidate countries 
for the next round of enlargement aggravated the tension and mistrust 
between the EU and Turkey.
The first-ever report on Turkey that was prepared by the EC (in 
November 1998) provoked a negative reaction as well. The report 
assessed Turkey’s progress toward pre-accession on the basis of the 
Copenhagen political criteria. It found Turkey wanting on all these cri-
teria. Regarding the Kurdish problem, the report noted that, “Turkey 
will have to find a political and non-military solution to the problem.”59 
The references to minority rights and the need for a political solution 
provoked criticism and even led to accusations of European aspira-
tions to undermine Turkey’s territorial integrity.60 During an interview, 
President Demirel also expressed his discomfort over the need to meet 
the Copenhagen criteria on minority rights because of Turkey’s genu-
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ine fear of separatism. He argued that such criteria imposed on Turkey 
could complicate its prospects for membership in the EU.61
This negative climate in EU-Turkish relations began to change, 
and moves reinforcing cooperation and goodwill started to emerge 
in 1999. In February 1999, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, 
was captured in Kenya. He was tried and convicted, receiving a death 
sentence in June of that year. The newly elected prime minister of Tur-
key, Bülent Ecevit, who was known for his lukewarm attitude toward 
the EU, became more supportive of EU membership. On the other 
hand, the new German social democrat government, led by Gerhard 
Schröeder, also began to make statements much more accommodating 
of Turkey. Traditionally, the Germans had been the most conspicuous 
opponents of giving Turkey EU membership. Ecevit’s commitment to 
political reforms in support of greater democracy, and the EU’s posi-
tive response, brought the two sides much closer. In December 1999, 
Ecevit persuaded his coalition government, including the right-wing 
nationalist MHP, to respect a call by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) for a stay of execution on Öcalan’s death sentence.
Turkey had accepted the right of its citizens to take complaints 
against Turkey to the ECHR in 1987, and since then had respected the 
Court’s rulings. Öcalan’s lawyers had complained to the ECHR that 
the ruling of the Turkish court was unjust. In an effort to review the 
complaint, the ECHR issued a stay of execution in November 1999.62 
Respecting the ECHR’s call was an extremely difficult and sensitive 
issue. Öcalan was seen by a large portion of the public as the culprit 
in years of death and destruction. Furthermore, the MHP had made 
it into the parliament as well as the coalition government on a ticket 
pledging that the death sentence of Öcalan would be carried through. 
After a contentious debate, the government decided to acquiesce to the 
ECHR call. This was taken by the EU, which required the lifting of the 
death penalty as a precondition for pre-accession, as a very positive 
and symbolically important gesture. It was a major contributing factor 
that opened the way to Turkish candidacy in December 1999.
A positive move from the EU came with the AP, reinforcing those 
circles in Turkey that advocated reforms and eventual EU membership. 
This document laid down a long list of economic, legal, and political 
reforms that Turkey had to introduce in order to meet the Copenhagen 
criteria. These included the adoption of cultural rights for minorities. 
However, in a marked departure from the progress report of 1998, the 
document shied away from using the term minority, a term whose use 
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on many occasions had marred EU-Turkish relations.63 Instead, the 
framers of the EU document chose to use much more subtle, politically 
inoffensive and nuanced language. It called for lifting the restrictions 
that denied Turkish citizens the option to broadcast in their mother 
tongue. It also called for assisting cultural diversity and securing the 
cultural rights (including education in the mother tongue) of all Turk-
ish citizens, irrespective of their origin. The wording clearly manifested 
a conscious effort to avoid the term minority and to emphasize cultural 
rather than minority rights. Indeed, this helped moderates disarm the 
arguments of hard-liners in Turkey. The lack of references to minority 
rights and political solutions, especially regarding the Kurds, meant 
that hard-liners could not argue their classic case based on the notion 
of the Sévres syndrome. Furthermore, it became much more difficult to 
accuse moderates of being traitors. Undoubtedly, these developments 
were very significant in the adoption of the critical reforms in October 
2001 and August 2002 that helped to diffuse the Kurdish problem.
Similar examples can also be offered from foreign policy issues 
independent of the Copenhagen political criteria. Since the adoption of 
the Treaty on the European Union in 1992, the EU has been striving to 
develop a common foreign and security policy. The Helsinki European 
Council summit was important not just for the decision on Turkey’s 
candidacy but also because it called for the establishment of military 
capabilities that would give the European Security and Defense Pol-
icy (ESDP) some teeth. However, ESDP also required the prerogative 
of using NATO facilities. Turkey, a longstanding member of NATO, 
made it known that it would veto the use of such facilities unless 
it was included in the decision-making process.64 The EU countries 
keen to have ESDP developed, such as France and Germany, resented 
Turkey’s position and considered it an effort to stall European integra-
tion. Delicate negotiations pursued between the United States, Britain 
informally representing the EU, and Turkey culminated in a prelimi-
nary agreement in November 2001 that broke the deadlock over the 
use of NATO facilities. It has generally been recognized that Turkey’s 
willingness to compromise played an important role in the invitation 
for Turkey to participate in the Convention on the Future of Europe, 
which would start in 2002 to draft a constitution for Europe.65 Austria 
and Germany were known to have objected to Turkey’s participation, 
and wanted to limit participation to countries that had already started 
pre-accession negotiations. The breakthrough on ESDP is cited as an 
important factor that helped tip the balance in favor of Turkey.
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In Turkey, the decision reached at the Laeken summit in December 
2001, in turn, helped make up for the deep resentment caused by the 
decision of the Nice summit in December 2000.66 At this summit, the 
EU adopted the treaty that included institutional adjustments to be 
introduced with the next round of enlargement. No allowance was 
made for Turkey’s membership. This was interpreted in Turkey, by the 
government as well as the public, as a sign that the EU was still not 
genuinely concerned about Turkish membership.
The actual breakthrough on ESDP did not arrive until the follow-
ing year. Once the November compromise had been reached, Britain 
took the agreement to the EU. However, this time Greece objected to 
certain aspects of the agreement and demanded their modification. 
Turkey considered the matter closed and a deadlock developed. It was 
tough negotiations between the newly formed Turkish government 
and the military, on the one hand, and between Turkey and the EU, on 
the other, that eventually led to yet another compromise arrangement, 
just days before the December 2002 Copenhagen summit. Without this 
breakthrough, it is highly unlikely that Turkey would have received 
December 2004 as a clear date when the EU would decide whether or 
not to start negotiations for accession. The Copenhagen decision was a 
major disillusionment for the new government that had lobbied very 
hard for a clear and unequivocal date. Yet, retrospectively, this decision 
did provide incentive to the government as well as to the Europhiles to 
push for the remaining critical reforms. This was yet another example 
of the two sides adopting policies that helped to reinforce confidence 
and cooperation with each other.
One last but critical example of the influence of positive interac-
tions between the EU and Turkey comes from January 2004. Romano 
Prodi became the first-ever president of the European Commission 
to visit Turkey during its more than 40-year-old relationship with the 
EU. Mr. Prodi stressed that a solution on Cyprus was not part of the 
Copenhagen political criteria that Turkey would be judged upon. The 
EU strategy paper adopted for Turkey, together with the 2003 progress 
report, had established a direct link between Turkey’s prospects of 
obtaining a negotiation date and the solution of the Cyprus problem. 
A public furor had exploded in Turkey as a result, and the Turkish 
government tried hard to get the reference to Cyprus taken out of the 
strategy paper. In Turkey, commentaries argued that the linkage was 
yet another example of the EU raising the bar as Turkey got close to 
meeting the criteria.
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In his speeches, Prodi made it very clear that the European Commis-
sion would base its judgment only on Turkey’s performance in respect 
to the Copenhagen political criteria when making its recommendation 
to the European Council on whether Turkey should or should not be 
given a date.67 He left little doubt that if Turkey continued its current 
performance, it would be very likely that the Commission would make 
a positive recommendation. He felt that the EU was duty bound to 
make such a recommendation if it was itself to live up to the Copenha-
gen criterion of respecting the “rule of law.” However, he also stressed 
that the ultimate decision at the European Council would be political, 
and that what happened in respect to the Cyprus problem could influ-
ence that decision. His remarks coincided with a period when the gov-
ernment was painstakingly trying to reform Turkey’s Cyprus policy.
At a summit meeting chaired by the president on 8 January, the 
decision to support the start of negotiations to find a solution to the 
Cyprus problem fell short of validating the Annan Plan. This was con-
sidered a sign that the hard-liners still prevailed. However, when the 
National Security Council meeting took place on the 23rd of January, 
the decision included the Annan Plan as a basis for negotiations. It 
was this final breakthrough that allowed the prime minister first to 
announce that Turkey was ready to negotiate on the basis of the Annan 
Plan at the Davos Economic Forum, and then called on President Bush 
to lend support for the negotiations. Prodi’s visit and remarks occurred 
on January 15 and 16, right between these two critical summits about 
Cyprus. It would not be wrong to suggest that these remarks did make 
a positive contribution to the change that occurred between the first 
and the second vital meetings on Cyprus in Ankara. Once the results of 
the referenda on the Annan Plan emerged, EU governments and offi-
cials, such as Gunter Verheugen, praised the Turkish side and commit-
ted themselves to advocate and support policies that would improve 
the lot of Turkish Cypriots. This helped to legitimize the new Turkish 
policy in the eyes of domestic constituencies in Turkey.
The above list is well short of being comprehensive. It is only meant 
to illustrate the point that both parties’ positive moves toward each 
other have reinforced a virtuous circle that has facilitated the task of 
the government in Turkey and the hand of the Europhiles in pushing 
reforms through and advocating a solution for Cyprus on the basis of 
the Annan Plan. This is not to mean that no negative moves have taken 
place. Both sides do make moves that weaken the hands of those who 
advocate stronger relations. The point, however, is that compared to 
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the past, the balance is a positive one and the mistrust has lessened. 
The EU is much more willing to make allowances for the occasional 
difficulties that the government faces in implementing some of the 
reforms. A notable case in point is the retrial of Leyla Zana and her col-
leagues.
The package of reforms that were adopted in February 2003 opened 
the way for the retrial. It is generally accepted that the new trial will 
lead to their acquittal, given the changes that were introduced to the 
very laws that led to their convictions. The EU has continuously called 
for their release from detention during the retrial. However, the court 
and the prosecutor’s office have resisted. The government has also 
been unable to bring about their release. One of the retrial sessions 
took place on the very day that Romano Prodi was visiting Turkey. 
The European Commission offered to reconsider the date of his visit 
but the Turkish side deemed it unnecessary. In his address to the Turk-
ish parliament on the day the court was due to meet, President Prodi 
recalled the importance that the EU attributed to the retrial of Zana 
and her colleagues, and to their continued detention. The court once 
more failed to ensure their release. Significantly, no crisis erupted in 
the relations of both sides. Both sides were much better at appreciating 
each other’s difficulties and were willing to focus on the grander long-
term objective. It is not surprising that in June 2004 this virtuous circle 
of interactions succeeded in bringing about an environment conducive 
to the release of Leyla Zana and her colleagues.
VI. Conclusion
Turkey is going through a massive transformation domestically as well 
as in terms of its foreign policy. It is generally recognized that at the 
pace at which the reforms and their implementation is moving, it is 
likely that the regular report of the European Commission will be 
positive, and that the Commission will finally recommend that nego-
tiations do start. The remaining challenge for the government is to 
ensure that the reforms continue and that those in Turkey who resist 
membership do not derail the process. The breakthrough achieved on 
Cyprus removed the last possible card that those in the EU who oppose 
Turkish membership and their counterpart, the Turkish Euroskeptics, 
could use to block Turkey from receiving a starting date for the pre-
accession process. The process leading to this drastic transformation of 
Turkey’s domestic and foreign politics can be attributed, ceteris paribus, 
Kemal Kirisci
71
to the dynamics of the domestic negotiation concerning the adoption 
of reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria as well as to the nature of 
the interactions between Turkish and EU players.
The decision whether to give a date to Turkey will be a tough one 
for the EU. Once a candidate country starts accession negotiations, 
membership is considered to be merely a matter of time. There has not 
been a single case in which a country that started negotiations has not 
been admitted. Yet obviously there could always be a first case. Public 
opinion in Europe is wary of this round of enlargement. Support for 
enlargement polls below 50%, on average. Support for Turkey has been 
even less than that. Furthermore, there are many other factors, rang-
ing from economic ones to the size and culture of Turkey, which work 
against the prospect of Turkish membership. Ultimately, though, a 
country’s membership has been the prerogative of the leadership in the 
candidate countries and in EU member states. In Turkey’s case, leader-
ship will have to play an even greater role. Commentaries appearing 
in the European media seem to be increasingly receptive to Turkey’s 
membership. Clearly, September 11 and the Iraqi crisis have played 
an important role. There is a growing appreciation in Europe of the 
importance of allowing Turkey membership in terms of the EU’s abil-
ity to continue its mission to export peace and stability to an ever wider 
geographical area. Even more importantly, there is a recognition that 
a reformed Turkey, with its pluralist democracy and secularism, can 
constitute an example for the rest of the Middle East and the Muslim 
world, which are themselves on the brink of a major transformation.
For the last couple of years, the challenge of EU membership was 
always Turkey’s challenge. Few in Europe believed that Turkey could 
meet the challenge. Many hid behind the belief that Turkey would 
never be able to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. This time the 
challenge is Europe’s challenge. Will Europe be able to admit the cen-
turies old “other” into its ranks? The EU succeeded in reconciling the 
rivalry and enmity between France and Germany. Most recently, it suc-
ceeded in overcoming the Cold War division in Europe. The outcome 
of the challenge will inevitably determine whether both sides succeed 
in achieving Turkey’s integration into the EU and anchor Turkey into 
the realm of “democratic peace,” as described in John O’Neal and 
Bruce Russett’s Triangulating Peace. Or will they fail in that and provoke 
a polarization between Turkey and Europe of the kind envisaged in 
Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations? Or will events develop in 
such a manner that Turkey’s reforms fail to gain root and Turkey drifts 
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into a state of “illiberal democracy,” as speculated by Zakaria Fareed in 
The Future of Freedom?
Epilogue68
After two days of nerve-wracking negotiations, political brinkman-
ship, and typical European Union style diplomacy, the European 
Council (the highest governing body of the EU, representing 25 mem-
ber countries) decided to open membership negotiations with Turkey 
on 3 October 2005.69 This recent summit had been preceded by a bit-
ter debate in Europe on Turkey’s eligibility for membership and its 
“Europeanness.” The resolution of the Cyprus problem also loomed 
as an insurmountable obstacle in front of Turkey. Nevertheless, with 
an unprecedented will by Turkish standards, the current government 
proceeded with the adoption of the remaining critical political reforms. 
The Progress Report on Turkey prepared by the European Commission 
acknowledged Turkey’s successes and concluded that Turkey had suf-
ficiently met the Copenhagen political criteria. It went on to recom-
mend that negotiations could be opened with Turkey “without delay,” 
as soon as some remaining reforms were completed.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, received a hero’s welcome upon their 
return from the European Council summit. Most of the media chose 
to emphasize the “full” part of the glass and termed the outcome a 
“success.” Yet, there are also many in Turkey and Europe who high-
light the “empty” part of the glass or at best have received the decision 
with mixed feelings. This is a function of the recognition that Turkey’s 
road to membership remains paved with a multitude of challenges, if 
not obstacles. Some of these challenges actually stem from the “buts” 
and qualifications that have been built into the decision to open the 
accession talks while another set stems from Europe and Turkey itself. 
Yet, these challenges or difficulties cannot hide the fact that the Euro-
pean Council is heralding a new era for both Europe and Turkey, with 
potential repercussions for the regions beyond. These give the decision 
a historic quality. •
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